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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
ALEX PRESTON NIMER, : Case No. 20090206-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Illegal 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2008), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Terry Christiansen, presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (Supp. 2009). 
See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred by denying Nimer's motion to suppress where 
his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer lacked probable cause. 
Standard of Review: "In an appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence," this Court will "'review the trial court's factual findings for clear 
error'" and will "'review its conclusions of law for correctness.'" Salt Lake City v. 
Bench, 2008 UT App 30,1J5, 177 P.3d 655 (quoting State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 
Tfl 1, 162 P.3d 1106). "Tn search and seizure cases, no deference is granted to . . . the 
[trial] court regarding the application of law to underlying factual findings."5 Id. (quoting 
State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, [^8, 147 P.3d 425) (alteration in original); see State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, Tfl5, 103 P.3d 699; State v. Warren. 2003 UT 36,1J12, 78 P.3d 590. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 38-66 (Motion to Suppress Due to Lack 
of Probable Cause to Arrest); 84-88 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law); 145 
(Motion Hearing). See Addendum B. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are determinative of the issue on appeal: U.S. Const, amend. IV; 
Utah Const, art. I, sec. 14; and Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37a-3 (Supp. 2008), 58-37a-4 
(2007), 58-37-8 (Supp. 2008), 77-7-2 (2008). See Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nimer was charged with one count each of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a second degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A 
misdemeanor. R. 1-2. On October 16, 2008, the trial court held a preliminary hearing 
and bound Nimer over on one count each of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A 
misdemeanor. R. 31-32; 48-66. 
Nimer filed a motion to suppress the "evidence of heroin and paraphernalia 
discovered on [his] person during a search incident to arrest." R. 38. He argued that 
Officer Joshua Thomas's "arrest was based upon a hunch" rather than probable cause 
and, therefore, "the arrest was illegal LUU\ uie search incident to arrest v Muucd lik i ourth 
: "\ iiiei ldn iei it of t.l le Hi lited States Coi istiti ltioi 1 ai id £ \.i tide I, sectioi 1 b I of the I Jtah • 
Constitution." R. 4u. After the State responded, the trial court heard argument on 
December 3, 2008, R 6 ^ 4 ; 1 *" The trial court, then deniedMiner's motion. R 88; 
I! h I I Iv In supjxirl . :• .
 k ln.il cmnl mude Ihcsc findings o(" lad; 
1. On August 1, 2008 Officer Joshua Thomas of the Midvale City 
Police Department responded to the parking lot of Sportsman's Warehouse 
located at approximately 165 West 7200 South in Salt Lake County. 
2. Officer Thomas was dispatched on a report of a su-piuou-
circumstance which involved a female in the parking lot ^ h • w a^  injecting 
heroin, 
3. When Officer Ihomas arrived he saw a female that was in the 
process of injecting a substance that was identified as heroin. Officer 
Thomas arrested the female identified as Bridget Renee Hood. 
4. As Officer Thomas was dealing with Ms. Hood, an employee of 
Sportsman's Warehouse stated that the store had video surveillance of the 
incident and that prior to the officer's arrival two men had been with the 
female who was injecting drugs. 
5. The employee pointed out the two men w 1 10 were at tl lat tii i le tie ai 
the front entrance of Sportsman's Warehouse. 
6. Officer Thomas approached the two men and asked them if they 
had any weapons or anything that he should know about. 
7. The Defendant, Alex Nimer, replied that he had some needles in 
his pocket including some open needles. 
8. Mr. Nimer removed the needles from his pocket and Officer 
I homas could see that the syringes were identical in appearance to the 
syringe that was in the [sic] Ms. Hood's arm, 
9. Officer ' Fhomas also stated that in his experience the needles 
differed from those that he has seen diabetics possess. 
10. Officer Thomas stated that the needles in this case were by 
themselves and were not contained in any type of kit. 
11. It is Officer Thomas's experience that diabet ics 1 \ pic.i 11 \ I.ji\ c 
liii :r needles in kits and accompanied with insulin. 
R. 85-SM; 145:LM 1. iheiri:! .VIMI ;r-- •;.; .le these conclusions of law: 
Ihe Officer's arrest decision is guided by a probable cause 
detern lination which is a much lower standard than beyond a reaso;.. : . 
doubt. It was reasonable for Officer Thomas to conclude that the needles 
possessed by Mr. Nimer were items of drug paraphernalia due to the facts 
that Mr. Nimer was identified as being with a Ms. Hood who was injecting 
heroin, the syringes he had were identical in appearance to the syringe she 
was using, and Mr. Nimer was close in proximity and time to Ms. Hood. 
Additionally the Court finds that Mr. Nimer's affirmative response to the 
Officer's question, "Do you have any weapons or anything we should know 
about?", reflects a consciousness of guilt and operates as an admission that 
Mr. Nimer's possession of the needles was not innocent. The Officer's 
decision to arrest Mr. Nimer was a reasonable decision in light of the 
Officer's experience and the totality of the circumstances and that decision 
was supported by probable cause to believe that Mr. Nimer was in 
possession of drug paraphernalia. 
R. 86; 145:14. Nimer entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, reserving the right to appeal the trial 
court's denial of the motion to suppress. R. 91; 93-94; 147:3-5. On January 28, 2009, he 
was sentenced to serve 365 days in jail. R. 97-99; 146:4-5. The trial court suspended the 
sentence, granted credit for six days previously served, and placed Nimer on probation 
for 18 months. R. 97-99; 146:5-6. Nimer filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 104-05. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This statement of facts is taken from the preliminary hearing transcript located at 
R. 48-66; see Addendum D. The trial court relied on Officer Joshua Thomas's 
preliminary hearing testimony when it decided Nimer's motion to suppress. R. 84. 
At the time of the preliminary hearing, Officer Thomas had been a police officer 
with Midvale City for a year and a half. R. 50. Before that, he worked for "Salt Lake 
County Protective Services for a year." R. 60. He had not "been trained in the detection 
[or] the identification of narcotics [or] narcotic paraphernalia." R. 59. He never went 
"through a class or anything." R. 60. If he had any instruction on drug paraphernalia, it 
A 
"was a long time ago" R. 60. T\ > >i:i his experience as a police officer, he was 
"[s]omewhat" familiar with "how drugs are used and nliai u|iiipinuit is |nsal|." \< /»0 
< in AIIJJUSI I 200K, ()1TJ(VT Thorn:)* was called to Sportsman's Warehouse for a 
"suspicious circumstance." R. :u I lie call "said a female was shooting up heroin" 
outside Sportsman's Warehouse. R 51). V, •, -t ;lv arrived at Sportsman's Warehouse, 
Officer 1 1 ic i i :ias sa \\ a \ v oi i laii, Bi idget K enee I food, ii I tl le pai king lot R 51; 55, I food 
was alone. R. 55. She was "sitting on the curb" on the east side of the store "between 
two parked cars." T? " \ She had "a rubber band around her arm" and was sticking a 
"needle inside ui
 :>, She appealed In he shooting u\\ hei -in I' > 1 " illi* t i 
" I ! lomas app i ' 'id took her into custody. R. 51. 
A Sportsman's Warehouse employee then exited the store and told Officer 
Thomas that two men had been "with the female at one \>.1ic •• . : : i -, ; 
were standing on the north side of the store next to the entrance. R. 54. Officer rhomas 
and another officer approached the men and "asked if they had [weapons or] anything in 
their pockets wre should ki io\ v aboi it " R 51 52; 57 One of the I n :i: I, Nil i ler, said "tl lat 
he had son le needles in his pockets." R. 52. Officer Thomas asked if any of the needles 
were open, andNimer "said yes." R. 52. Nimer then complied with Officer Thomas's 
order to remove the needles from his p •* iwi *\i: :- . r 
I I ion las an ested I Jii ner "imi i lediately' ^ * * •" ic needles on ihe ground, K. 52, 58. 
Officer Thomas could not recall, but he thought there were at least five needles. 
R. 58. He described the needles as having a "clear tube vv ith an orange cap on the end " 
R. 57. Later, by stipulated proffer at the motion hearing, he said the needles "were 
identical to the needle" that was in Hood's arm. R. 145:3-4. Officer Thomas "assumed" 
the needles were paraphernalia because the men had been with Hood at some point and 
the needles were not accompanied by "insulin or a black kit." R. 61-62. At the motion 
hearing, the defense entered into evidence "statistical evidence from the Utah Department 
of Health" showing that "9,972 residents of Salt Lake County adults are insulin 
dependent diabetics who use needles." R. 145:4; see Defense Ex. 1. 
During the search incident to arrest, Officer Thomas "found a sock" filled with 
seven balloons. R. 52; 59. When Officer Thomas asked Nimer what was in the balloons, 
he said it was heroin. R. 52. The substance later tested positive for heroin. R. 52-53. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse because the trial court erred by denying Nimer5 s motion 
to suppress. To justify a warrantless arrest, an officer must have probable cause to 
believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense. Probable cause is 
more than a hunch or suspicion. Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances 
within the officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. 
In this case, the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress because the 
totality of the circumstances show the arrest was not justified by probable cause. 
Hypodermic needles are lawful to possess. They are only paraphernalia if they are used, 
or intended for use to parenterally inject a controlled substance into the human body. 
Officer Thomas arrested Nimer for possession of drug paraphernalia because Nimer was 
seen with Hood at one time; he had hypodermic needles in his pockets; he answered yes 
when asked if any of the needles were open; he did not produce insulin or a black kit 
when he removed the needles from his pocket; and the needles looked identical to the 
needle Hood had been using. When viewed under the totality of the circumstances, 
however, these facts did not amount to probable cause. 
At the time of the arrest, Officer Thomas knew nothing about Nimer's interaction 
with Hood. He simply assumed the encounter was drug related. He also knew nothing 
about Nimer or why Nimer had hypodermic needles. He simply assumed, without 
asking, that the needles were for illicit drug use. Nimer did not act nervous or suspicious 
during the encounter. Nor did he exhibit any signs of drug use. His demeanor revealed 
nothing but a desire to be helpful and to ensure Officer Thomas's safety should he 
conduct a search. Officer Thomas was not trained to recognize drug paraphernalia and 
was only somewhat familiar with what it looked like. Under these circumstances, he 
lacked probable cause to arrest. Instead, he should have investigated the situation in 
order to substantiate or dispel his suspicions. Because the arrest was conducted without 
probable cause, therefore, this Court should hold it violated the Fourth Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED BY RULING THE ARREST DID NOT 
VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the 'right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.5" State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (quoting U.S. 
Const, amend. IV). "[T]o justify a warrantless arrest 'an officer must have probable 
cause . . . to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense.'" State 
v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, ^ [10, 89 P.3d 185 (citation omitted); see Utah Code Ann. § 
77-7-2 (2008) ("A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: (1) (a) for any public offense committed or attempted in 
the presence of any peace officer;... (2) when the peace officer has reasonable cause to 
believe a felony or a class A misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause 
to believe that the person arrested has committed i t . . . " ) . 
An arrest may not be based "on a hunch" or the "mere suspicion that" the suspect 
has committed or is committing an offense. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96 at [^16. Rather, 
"the officer must be able to point to specific facts which, considered with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the [seizure]." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at 
Tfl4 (citation omitted); see id. ("In determining reasonableness, 'due weight must be 
given, not to [an officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to 
specific reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light 
of his experience.'" (citation omitted) (alterations in original)). In other words, 
"'[p]robable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been 
or is being committed.'" State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, TJ34, 164 P.3d 397 (citation 
omitted); see State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, ^ 27, 57 P.3d 1052. 
8 
"A probable cause determination is an objective test, based on whether 'a 
reasonable and prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in believing 
that the suspect had committed the offense.'" State v. Henderson, 2007 UT App 125, [^9, 
159 P.3d 397 (citation omitted) (alteration in original); see State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 
1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) ("The validity of the probable cause determination is made from 
the objective standpoint of a 'prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer . . . guided by 
his experience and training.'" (citation omitted)). "Determinations of whether probable 
cause exists require a common sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting the arresting . . . officer." State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995); see State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, ^|9, 173 P.3d 213. "In other words, 
'[this Court will] examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide "whether 
these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police 
officer, amount to" probable cause.'" Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96 at ^10 (citation omitted). 
In Hechtle, for example, this Court reversed the denial of a motion to suppress 
because the trooper lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the 
influence of a controlled substance (marijuana). In that case, the trooper stopped 
defendant for speeding. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96 at [^12. Thereafter, he arrested 
defendant for DUI because defendant and the front seat passenger lit cigarettes as he 
approached; there were "two or three air fresheners in the passenger compartment"; 
defendant was "very helpful during the stop"; defendant's "eyes were red, droopy, and 
watery"; defendant's "pupils were dilated"; and defendant's "tongue was green with 
blistering toward the back." Id This Court reversed because the totality of the 
circumstances did not create probable cause to arrest. The "multiple air fresheners" and 
"the condition of [defendant's] eyes" supported the trooper's "belief that [defendant] may 
have been engaged in criminal activity." Id. at ^13. But the trooper stopped defendant 
for speeding, not driving erratically; the State presented no "authority[] to support the 
reliability of the trooper's concern regarding the condition of [defendant's] tongue"; 
"helpfulness during the traffic stop . . . [did] not contribute to the development of 
probable cause"; the trooper "noted no visible drug paraphernalia, no signs of recent drug 
use, and no odor of marijuana"; and the trooper "did nothing to confirm his suspicions." 
Id. at YP3-14 (citation and emphasis omitted). Further, although the trooper's training 
and experience may have made him "extremely knowledgeable about 'drugs and drug-
related offenses,'" he was "not a certified drug recognition examiner (DRE)"; "had a 
DRE been involved in this case, the facts before this court would, most likely, be 
radically different." Id at ^13 n.3. 
Whereas, in State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this Court rejected 
defendant's argument "that there was an insufficient nexus between him and the 
contraband found during the initial search to justify his arrest." Lee, 863 P.2d at 58. In 
that case, defendant was arrested for unlawful possession of a controlled substance after 
he "emerged from a bedroom" containing heroin and "paraphernalia to 'cut' and inject 
the heroin"; "fresh hypodermic 'tracks' were seen on [his] arms"; and "indicia of heroin 
intoxication were observed, such as [his] 'nodding off.'" Id The arresting officer "had 
dealt with heroin, and specifically persons intoxicated with heroin, 'many times.'" Id 
He testified that "nodding off was an '"obvious effect' of heroin intoxication." Id This 
Court agreed that "falling asleep immediately after the execution of a no-knock entry and 
during the consequent search of the premises [was] highly irregular behavior." Id. Thus, 
"[n]odding off, coupled with the nearby presence of heroin and the instruments used to 
inject that heroin, plus physical evidence of injection, properly established] probable 
cause to arrest." Id; see also State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125 (Utah) (upholding arrest 
where officer overheard talk about shooting up and heroin, twice saw hand holding 
syringe squirt clear substance into alley, and saw two gelatin capsules heated and syringe 
used to inject into each other's arm), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977). 
In this case, the trial court erred by upholding the arrest because the totality of the 
circumstances show that the arrest was not supported by probable cause. See infra at Part 
A. Accordingly, this Court should suppress all of the evidence discovered in this case 
because its discovery was a direct result of the illegal arrest. See infra at Part B. 
A. The Arrest Violated the Fourth Amendment Because It Was Not Supported 
by Probable Cause. 
Officer Thomas arrested Nimer for unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia 
because he had hypodermic needles. R. 69. "It is unlawful for any person to use, or to 
possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, 
harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, 
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 
(Supp. 2008). Hypodermics needles may be paraphernalia, but only if they are "used, or 
intended for use to parenterally inject a controlled substance into the human body." Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-3(l 1) (Supp. 2008). Factors relevant to "determining whether an 
object is drug paraphernalia," include: 
(1) statements by the owner or by anyone in control of the object 
concerning its use; 
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the 
object . . . ; 
(3) the proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of 
this chapter; 
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled substance; 
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object; 
(6) instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object 
concerning its use; 
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict 
its use; 
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use; 
(9) the manner in which the object is displayed for sale; 
(10) whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate 
supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed 
distributor or dealer of tobacco products; 
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ration of sales of the object to 
the total sales of the business enterprise; 
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the 
community; and 
(13) expert testimony concerning its use. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-4 (2007). 
The totality of the circumstances that supported Nimer's arrest were that Nimer 
was seen with Hood "at one time," R. 51; 55-56; Nimer was in the same parking lot as 
Hood, R. 51; 54-55; when asked if he had any weapons or anything the officers should 
know about, Nimer said "that he had some needles in his pockets," R. 51-52; 57; Nimer 
said "yes" when asked if any of the needles were open, R. 52; when ordered to take the 
needles out of his pockets, Nimer produced the needles, but did not also produce "insulin 
or a black kit," R. 61-62; and the needles had "clear tube[s] with [] orange cap[s]" and 
appeared to be identical to the needle Hood had been using. R. 57; 145:3-4. Based on 
this information and "the Officer's experience," the trial court concluded that the arrest 
was lawful. R. 86; 145:14. The trial court's conclusion was incorrect because it failed to 
account for the totality of the circumstances which, when considered, reveal that Officer 
Thomas arrested Nimer based on "a mere 'hunch.'" State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 
1138 (Utah 1989); see State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Thus, 
this Court should reverse because the arrest was unlawful. 
First, the "suspicious circumstance" that brought Officer Thomas to Sportsman's 
Warehouse had nothing to do with Nimer. R. 50. He was called to the store because "a 
female was shooting up heroin" outside the store. R. 50. When he arrived, Hood was 
alone in the parking lot on the east side of the building. R. 51; 55. She was engaged in 
illicit behavior, but her illicit behavior was hidden from view because she was "sitting on 
the curb" "between two parked cars." R. 51; 55. In particular, it was unobservable to 
and unconnected with Nimer, who was standing out in the open on the north side of the 
building near the store entrance. R. 54. 
True, store employees said Nimer and his companion had been "with the female at 
one time." R. 51; 55-56. But the employees did not say where, when, or for how long 
the men had been with Hood. R. 56. Nor did they say what, if anything, the men and 
Hood had done together. R. 56. In particular, they did not say whether Nimer's 
interaction with Hood was at all suspicious. R. 56. There were many innocuous reasons 
for Nimer to interact with Hood. Given that Hood was sitting on the curb, Nimer may 
have been checking to see if she was all right. Or, as often happens in parking lots, Hood 
may have asked Nimer for some spare change. If Nimer heeded her request, the resulting 
interaction could have taken several minutes and resulted in money exchanging hands. 
Or, made nervous by Hood's suspicious appearance, Nimer could have been urging her to 
move away from his car. Or, unaware of Hood's illicit activities, Nimer simply could 
have been asking for the time or directions. Despite the many innocent reasons that 
Nimer may have interacted with Hood, Officer Thomas assumed the interaction was 
drug-related. See Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96 at f 14. Without any information as to 
where, when, why, or for how long Nimer and his companion were with Hood, however, 
Officer Thomas's assumption was "a mere 'hunch.'" Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138; cf. 
State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ('"[F]rom the viewpoint of the 
observer, an innocent gesture can often be mistaken for a guilty movement'"; 
accordingly, "other factors must be shown which, in the totality of the circumstances, 
would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that there is evidence of criminal 
activity." (citations omitted)); Powell v. United States, 649 A.2d 1082, 1086 (D.C. 1994) 
(holding "'[a] vague suspicion based largely on ambiguous conduct. . . where the only 
reason for the stop and investigation is a simple traffic offense without any indication of 
criminal activity either on the part of the driver or passengers . . . [i]n our view do[es] not 
establish a reasonable basis for a frisk'" (alterations in original)). 
Second, Nimer exhibited no suspicious behavior during the police encounter. 
When Officer Thomas approached him, Nimer was standing out in the open near the 
store entrance. R. 54. He did not exhibit fresh needle tracks on his arms or any other 
tale-tell signs of drug abuse. R. 54; compare Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96 at [^14 (reversing 
1 A 
denial of motion to suppress where trooper "noted no visible drug paraphernalia, no signs 
of recent drug use, and no odor of marijuana" (emphasis omitted)); with Lee, 863 P.2d at 
58 (affirming denial of motion to suppress where officer noted "fresh hypodermic 
'tracks'" on defendant's arms). Nor was there any suggestion that Nimer was known to 
Officer Thomas as a person with prior drug convictions or a history of drug abuse. R. 50-
62. Further, Nimer did he appear nervous or evasive. R. 51-52; 54; 57. To the contrary, 
he readily answered Officer Thomas's questions in a voice and manner devoid of slurring 
or other traits associated with drug abuse. R. 52; compare Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96 at 
T[14; with Lee, 863 P.2d at 58. And the answers Nimer gave were honest, accurate, and 
not incriminating: When asked if he had any weapons or anything that the officer should 
know about, he said that he had hypodermic needles, and, when asked if any of the 
needles were open, he said "yes." R. 52; compare State v. Marquez, 2007 UT App 170, 
TJ15, 163 P.3d 687 (upholding arrest where defendant, in response to questioning during 
lawful frisk, "voluntarily told Officer [] that his pocket contained drug paraphernalia"). 
Far from being incriminating, Nimer's answers only demonstrated a desire to comply 
with Officer Thomas's requests and a concern for Officer Thomas's safety should he 
conduct a search. R. 52; 54; see Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96 at fl4 (noting "helpfulness 
during [a] stop . . . does not contribute to the development of probable cause"). 
Third, Officer Thomas was concerned because the needles Nimer produced 
appeared to be identical to the needle used by Hood. R. 145:3-4. The State, however, 
presented no "authority[] to support the reliability o f Officer Thomas's concern. 
Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96 at ^13 (citation omitted). It may be that most, if not all, 
hypodermic syringes have a "clear tube with an orange cap on the end." R. 57. Further, 
unlike with Hood, Officer Thomas did not see any residue or other signs that Nimer 
intended the needles for illicit rather than legitimate use. R. 57; 145:3-4. There were 
numerous innocuous reasons for Nimer to possess hypodermic needles. He may have 
suffered from diabetes, asthma, severe allergies, multiple sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, 
AIDS, or some other ailment that required him to carry medicine for regular or 
emergency use. He may have recently undergone a surgery that required him to carry 
specialized medicine such as blood thinners. He may have had a family member or 
friend—particularly a child—whose illness or allergies required him to carry medicine. 
Or he may have been a nurse, paramedic, emergency medical technician, or other medical 
professional, who carried medicine for professional purposes or in case of an emergency. 
Despite Nimer's compliant behavior, Officer Thomas chose not to ask Nimer why 
he had the needles or whether he had prescription medication to accompany the needles. 
R. 52; 58; 61-62. Rather, he "immediately" "assumed" the needles were paraphernalia 
because Nimer did not also produce "insulin or a black kit." R. 52; 58; 61-62. This 
assumption, however, was unreasonable. Cf Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96 at Tf 13 (reversing 
denial of motion to suppress where State presented no "authority [] to support the 
reliability of the trooper's concern regarding the condition of [defendant's] tongue"). 
Needles are not paraphernalia whenever they are unaccompanied by "insulin or a black 
kit." R. 61-62. Rather, they are paraphernalia if, and only if, they are "used, or intended 
for use to parenterally inject a controlled substance into the human body." Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-3(l 1) (Supp. 2008). A person who has to carry diabetic, asthma, and/or 
other medical supplies may, depending on personal preference, decide to carry the 
medical supplies in "a black kit," R. 61-62; but he or she may also decide to carry the 
supplies in a purse, cooler, camera bag, or pocket. Likewise, he or she may choose to 
store insulin (or other medications) with the needles or, depending on personal preference 
and the stability of the medication, choose to store the medicine in a different location. 
Hypodermic needles are not illegal to possess, and officers will inevitably encounter 
citizens carrying hypodermic needles for legitimate medical purposes. See, e.g., R. 
145:4; Defense Ex. 1. Given Nimer's cooperative behavior, it would have been easy for 
Officer Thomas to ask him why he had the needles. R. 52-60. Officer Thomas, however, 
did not question Nimer; instead, he simply assumed the needles were paraphernalia and 
arrested Nimer. R. 52; 58; 61-62; compare Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96 at [^14 (reversing 
denial of motion to suppress because trooper "did nothing to confirm his suspicions"). 
Fourth, Officer Thomas's training and experience did not give him specialized 
knowledge that somehow enabled him to identify a hypodermic needle as paraphernalia 
without any investigation. At the time of the preliminary hearing (two and one-half 
month's after Nimer's arrest), Officer Thomas had only been an officer "for a year and a 
half." R. 50. Before that, he had worked for "Salt Lake County Protective Services for a 
year." R. 60. Officer Thomas's limited experience as a police officer had made him 
"[s]omewhat" familiar with "how drugs are used and what equipment is [used]," but he 
had never "been trained in the detection [or] the identification of narcotics [or] narcotic 
paraphernalia." R. 59-60. Or, if he had, it "was a long time ago," and he did not 
remember it. R. 60; compare Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96 at }^13 n.3 (reversing denial of 
motion to suppress and noting that trooper may have been "extremely knowledgeable 
about 'drugs and drug-related offenses,'" but he was "not a certified drug recognition 
examiner"; and "had a DRE been involved in this case, the facts before this court would, 
most likely, be radically different"). 
In sum, "the facts leading to Officer [Thomas's] suspicion [were] too attenuated to 
justify the inference" that Nimer was unlawfully in possession of paraphernalia. Warren, 
2003 UT 36 at ^[33. The totality of the circumstances shows that Nimer was an 
unsuspicious person standing out in the open near the store entrance. Officer Thomas 
could have questioned the store employees about Nimer's interaction with Hood, but he 
chose not to. See White, 856 P.2d at 661, 663, 665 (holding, in frisk case, that if person's 
movement is "innocuous," officer has a "duty to observe" him and, if it can "be safely 
undertaken," to question him). Officer Thomas also could have questioned Nimer about 
his interaction with Hood or about why he was carrying hypodermic needles, but Officer 
Thomas chose not to. See id. Instead, Officer Thomas "immediately" "assumed" that 
Nimer possessed paraphernalia. R. 52; 58; 61-62. Officer Thomas's assumption was not 
based on specialized training or experience. R. 50; 59-60. By his own admission, 
Officer Thomas had no training in identification of drug paraphernalia, had less than a 
year and a half of police experience, and was only "[s]omewhat" familiar with drug 
paraphernalia. R. 50; 59-60. Rather, it was based on a hunch. Thus, this Court should 
hold that the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. To hold otherwise would mean that 
the many Utah citizens who lawfully carry hypodermic needles for legitimate medical 
purposes will be subject to arrest if they are unlucky enough to encounter a homeless 
person or drug addict in a store parking lot and do not carry their medical supplies in a 
way that the officer recognizes as proper. See, e.g., R. 145:4; Defense Ex. 1. 
B. This Court Should Suppress All of the Evidence Found In This Case Because 
Its Discovery and Confiscation Was a Direct Result of the Illegal Arrest. 
"Under the exclusionary rule, 'evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal 
search and seizure.5" State v. Zesiger, 2003 UT App 37, f^l 15 65 P.3d 314 (quoting 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). "The exclusionary rule 'also 
prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence . . . that is the product of. . . or that is 
otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search.'5' LI (quoting Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1988)); see also State v. McGrath, 928 P.2d 1033, 
1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("To deter violations of Fourth Amendment rights,. . . 
illegally-acquired evidence is inadmissible." (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383, 398 (1914))). To determine whether evidence should be suppressed, courts "focus 
on whether the evidence resulted primarily from the ' "exploitation of [the] illegality'" or 
'"by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'"" McGrath, 
928 P.2d at 1036 (alteration in original) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 488 (1963) (citation omitted)). 
In this case, this Court should suppress all of the evidence gathered against Nimer 
because its discovery was a direct result of the illegal arrest and the subsequent search 
incident to arrest. Absent the illegal arrest, Officer Thomas would not have conducted 
the search incident to arrest. R. 52; 59. Absent the search incident to arrest, Officer 
Thomas would not have determined that the hypodermic needles were paraphernalia or 
discovered the balloons. R. 52; 59. He also would not have questioned Nimer about the 
balloons, elicited Nimer's statement that the balloons contained heroin, or had the 
substance tested and determined to be positive for heroin. R. 52-53. Thus, all of the 
evidence, including the hypodermic needles, the balloons, the substance contained in the 
balloons, and Nimer's statement that the balloons contained heroin, must be suppressed 
because their discovery and confiscation was the direct result of the illegal arrest. See 
McGrath, 928 P.2d at 1036; Zesiger, 2003 UT App 37 at f 11. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Nimer's conviction because the trial court erred by 
denying his motion to suppress the evidence taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
SUBMITTED this / / f day of March, 2010. 
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALEX PRESTON NIMER, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 081401932 FS 
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
Date: January 28, 2009 
PRESENT 
Clerk: mindyg 
Prosecutor: HILL, JOSEPH S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CHESNUT, HEATHER J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 2, 198 8 
Audio 
Tape Number: 9007 Tape Count: 903 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - Class A 
Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 12/16/2008 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for 
this charge is 353 day(s). 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 6 day(s) previously served. 
Case No: 081401932 
Date: Jan 28, 2009 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2075.00 
Surcharge: $208.78 
Due: $425.00 
Total Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $2075.00 
Total Surcharge: $208.78 
Total Principal Due: $425 
Plus Interest 
The fine is to be paid in full by 05/28/2010. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $300.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Adult Probation 
& Parole. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month (s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 12 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 425.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine on or before May 28, 2010. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
No other violations. 
Comply with Adult Probation and Parole. 
Notify the court of any address change. 
Timely payments of all fines, attorney fees and restitution. 
Not to possess/consume alcohol or non prescribed controlled 
substance. 
Random urinalysis and drug testing as requested. 
Notify probation agent of any prescribed medication. 
Case No: 081401932 
Date: Jan 28, 2009 
Not to associate with persons or frequent places where drugs or 
alcohol are being used or are the chief item of sale. 
Submit to search of self or property by probation agent. 
Receive drug and alcohol evaluation and comply with 
recommendations. 
Research paper on drugs. 
Maintain fulltime verifiable employment/education. 
Deft to complete a research paper on Heroin by 2-28-09 in lieu of 6 
days jail 
Deft may have credit towards the fine for costs of evaluation and 
treatment 
Bail maybe exonerated and returned to defts father 
Pay fines and fees to AP&P, agent to determine monthly payments 
Dated this _JjJ& day of 
ISTTIASTSEN _ ^ . 
cSurt *JudgeVr 
USL i) nf DlRECTIONfOF JUDGE 
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LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
AARON W. FLATER, 9458 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
6020730 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Alex Preston Nimer, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 081401932 
The Honorable Terry L. Christiansen 
THE ABOVE-TITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court on December 3, 2008, for 
hearing and judgment on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The Honorable Terry L. 
Christiansen presided. The Defendant was represented by Heather Chesnut. Aaron W. Flater, 
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County, represented the State. The Court notes that 
Officer Joshua Thomas of the Midvale City Police Department previously testified at a 
preliminary hearing on October 165 2008. The Court has reviewed a transcript of the Officer's 
testimony and finds the testimony to be credible and relies on that testimony for purposes of this 
hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress. Additionally, the court accepts State's proffer 
and the defendant's stipulation that Officer Thomas would testify that the syringes that the 
Defendant Alex Nimer had in his possession were identical in appearance to the syringe being 
used by the Co-Defendant, Bridget Renee Hood to inject heroin in her arm at the Sportman's 
0G00S4 
ORIGINAL^ 
Warehouse parking lot. Based upon the memoranda of law submitted and the arguments of 
counsel presented, and for good cause shown, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. On August 1, 2008 Officer Joshua Thomas of the Midvale City Police Department responded 
to the parking lot of Sportman's Warehouse located at approximately 165 West 7200 South in 
Salt Lake County. 
2. Officer Thomas was dispatched on a report of a suspicious circumstance which involved a 
female in the parking lot who was injecting heroin. 
3. When Officer Thomas arrived he saw a female that was in the process of injecting a substance 
that was identified as heroin. Officer Thomas arrested the female identified as Bridget Renee 
Hood. 
4. As Officer Thomas was dealing with Ms. Hood, an employee of Sportsman's Warehouse 
stated that the store had video surveillance of the incident and that prior to the officer's arrival 
two men had been with the female who was injecting drugs. 
5. The employee pointed out the two men who were at that time near the front entrance of 
Sportsman's Warehouse. 
6. Officer Thomas approached the two men and asked them if they had any weapons or anything 
that he should know about. 
7. The Defendant, Alex Nimer, replied that he had some needles in his pocket including some 
open needles. 
8. Mr. Nimer removed the needles from his pocket and Officer Thomas could see that the 
syringes were identical in appearance to the syringe that was in the Ms. Hood's arm. 
9. Officer Thomas also stated that in his experience the needles differed from those that he has 
seen diabetics possess. 
10. Officer Thomas stated that the needles in this case were by themselves and were not 
contained in any type of kit. 
11. It is Officer Thomas's experience that diabetics typically have their needles in kits and 
accompanied with insulin. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Officer's arrest decision is guided by a probable cause determination which is a 
much lower standard than beyond a reasonable doubt. It was reasonable for Officer Thomas to 
conclude that the needles possessed by Mr. Nimer were items of drug paraphernalia due to the 
facts that Mr. Nimer was identified as being with a Ms. Hood who was injecting heroin, the 
syringes he had were identical in appearance to the syringe she was using, and Mr. Nimer was 
close in proximity and time to Ms. Hood. Additionally the Court finds that Mr. Nimer's 
affirmative response to the Officer's question, "Do you have any weapons or anything we should 
know about?", reflects a consciousness of guilt and operates as an admission that Mr. Nimer's 
possession of the needles was not innocent. The Officer's decision to arrest Mr. Nimer was a 
reasonable decision in light of the Officer's experience and the totality of the circumstances and 
that decision was supported by probable cause to believe that Mr. Nimer was in possession of 
drug paraphernalia. 
zfrpr 
DATED this day of , 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
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LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
AARON W. FLATER, 9458 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
6020730 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Alex Preston Nimer, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 081401932 
The Honorable Terry L. Christiansen 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is hereby ORDERED, that 
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied. 
DATED this ( day of j ^ S » 2008. 
BY THE COU 
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1 inquiry about it, "Are you a diabetic? Do you have these for 
2 a medical purpose?" Ask the employees questions. I mean it 
3 would have been required that he get just a little bit more 
4 to meet the probably cause standard. He just didn't do it, 
5 he just arrested, just on the basis of these needles. We 
6 would submit it. 
7 THE COURT: All right. The Court makes the 
8 following findings. On August 1, 2008 Officer Thomas 
9 received information from a Midvale Police Department 
10 dispatch that a female was shooting up heroin at the 
11 Sportsman's Warehouse. Upon arrival at the Sportsman's 
12 Warehouse, Officer Thomas observed a female shooting up 
13 heroin in the parking lot of the business, (3) that after 
14 arresting the female a Sportsman's Warehouse employee told 
15 Officer Thomas they had videotaped the female with two other 
16 males. The employee then pointed out the defendant and 
17 another male as being the two males spotted on the camera 
18 with the female. Officer Thomas then approached the 
19 defendant and the other male in the parking lot next to the 
20 Sportsman's Warehouse and when asked if there was anything he 
21 should be aware of or know about, he said he had some needles 
22 and that one of the needles was open. The officer had the 
23 defendant remove the needles from his pocket, place them on 
24 the ground. The needles that were placed on the ground were 
25 I identical to the needle that the female individual was seen 
13 
1 earlier shooting up heroin. 
2 Officer Thomas then arrested the defendant for 
3 possession of drug paraphernalia and in a search incident to 
4 arrest found the defendant in possession of heroin. Those 
5 are the findings the Court makes to support the conclusions 
6 of law. 
7 Probable cause is not beyond a reasonable doubt. 
8 Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts known to the 
9 officer and inferences can fairly be drawn therefrom are 
10 reasonable to a person, the officer's position would be 
11 justified in believing the suspect had committed the offense. 
12 In this particular case there is proximity in time 
13 and location between Mr. Nimer and the female co-defendant. 
14 Furthermore, there are identical needles. When the officer 
15 asked the defendant if he had anything he should know about, 
16 the defendant promptly stated that he had some needles and 
17 that one was open. I would think that his response is 
18 indicative of the fact that those needles were paraphernalia. 
19 I think if an individual was possessing needles for an 
20 insulin injection, I don't know that they would respond that 
21 the officer needed to know about that but where you have a 
22 situation where a drug was being used by a companion of Mr. 
23 Nimer, certainly this Court believes that that is probable 
24 cause of criminal activity. 
25 Based on the foregoing, I'm going to deny the 
14 
1 Motion to Suppress. 
2 Mr. Flater, I'll have you prepare the findings of 
3 facts and conclusions of law. 
4 All right. We need to set this case for trial, 
5 disposition? What is your preference, Ms. Chesnut? 
6 MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, may we revisit this case 
7 in a few moments? I'll talk to Mr. Flater? 
8 THE COURT: Sure, we'll pass if for a moment. 
9 All right, next case? 
10 (Whereupon another case was handled) 
11 MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, if we could call Alex 
12 Nimer? 
13 THE COURT: You bet. 
14 MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, we'd request (inaudible). 
15 THE COURT: All right. Let's set a disposition date 
16 in two weeks. I can do it on either the 16th or 18th of 
17 December. 
18 MS. CHESNUT: I s t h e 16 t h a T u e s d a y ? 
19 THE COURT: I t i s . 
20 MS. CHESNUT: I'm in trial on the 18th, so the 16th. 
21 THE COURT: All right, December 16 at 8:30. Thank 
22 you. 
23 J (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
24 
25 | -c-
15 
TabC 
U. S. CONST. AMEND. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 14 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden-Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-3 (Supp. 2008) 
§ 58-37a-3. "Drug paraphernalia" defined 
As used in this chapter, "drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, product, or material 
used, or intended for use, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, package, repackage, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce a controlled substance into 
the human body in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, and 
includes, but is not limited to: 
(1) kits used, or intended for use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, or har-
vesting any species of plant which is a controlled substance or from which a controlled 
substance can be derived; 
(2) kits used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, 
processing, or preparing a controlled substance; 
(3) isomerization devices used, or intended for use, to increase the potency of any species 
of plant which is a controlled substance; 
(4) testing equipment used, or intended for use, to identify or to analyze the strength, ef-
fectiveness, or purity of a controlled substance; 
(5) scales and balances used, or intended for use, in weighing or measuring a controlled 
substance; 
(6) diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannited, dextrose 
and lactose, used, or intended for use to cut a controlled substance; 
(7) separation gins and sifters used, or intended for use to remove twigs, seeds, or other 
impurities from marihuana; 
(8) blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used, or intended for use to 
compound a controlled substance; 
(9) capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, or intended for use to package 
small quantities of a controlled substance; 
(10) containers and other objects used, or intended for use to store or conceal a controlled 
substance; 
(11) hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, or intended for use to paren-
terally inject a controlled substance into the human body; and 
(12) objects used, or intended for use to ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body, including but not limited to: 
(a) metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens, 
permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls; 
(b) water pipes; 
(c) carburetion tubes and devices; 
(d) smoking and carburetion masks; 
(e) roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning material, such as a marihuana 
cigarette, that has become too small or too short to be held in the hand; 
(f) miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vials; 
(g) chamber pipes; 
(h) carburetor pipes; 
(i) electric pipes; 
(j) air-driven pipes; 
(k) chillums; 
(1) bongs; and 
(m) ice pipes or chillers. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-4 (2007) 
§ 58-37a-4. Considerations in determining whether object is drug paraphernalia 
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trier of fact, in addition to all 
other logically relevant factors, should consider: 
(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use; 
(2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, under any 
state or federal law relating to a controlled substance; 
(3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this chapter; 
(4) The proximity of the object to a controlled substance; 
(5) The existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object; 
(6) Instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use; 
(7) Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use; 
(8) National and local advertising concerning its use; 
(9) The manner in which the object is displayed for sale; 
(10) Whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate supplier of like or 
related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of tobacco products; 
(11) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to the total sales of 
the business enterprise; 
(12) The existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the community; and 
(13) Expert testimony concerning its use. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2008) 
§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts-Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A-Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufac-
ture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or ar-
range to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any viola-
tion of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; 
and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 
58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in 
concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a posi-
tion of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or gam-
mahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third de-
gree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree 
felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon 
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) 
may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if 
the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76- 10-501 was used, carried, or 
possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in 
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for 
a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may addi-
tionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree fe-
lony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years 
and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be sus-
pended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B-Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance 
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional prac-
tice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tene-
ment, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit 
them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing con-
trolled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged pre-
scription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felo-
ny; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third 
degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part 
of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor. 
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(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a con-
viction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled 
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii)? including less than one 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the 
person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior 
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-
13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one 
degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect 
to controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indetermi-
nate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year 
to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indetermi-
nate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person 
convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not 
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his body any 
measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
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(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, 
causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in 
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty 
of a second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-
4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Prohibited acts C-Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a 
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, 
for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent 
himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, 
or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administra-
tion of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be 
attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his re-
ceiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, sub-
terfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the 
use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or writ-
ten under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing de-
signed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying 
mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any 
drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled sub-
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stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felo-
ny. 
(4) Prohibited acts D~Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this 
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chap-
ter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Con-
trolled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications 
under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of 
those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the 
grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds 
which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a 
school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10- 501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playh-
ouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds in-
cluded in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the 
act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or dis-
tribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of 
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any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and 
shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would oth-
erwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) would have been a first degree 
felony. 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is 
not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been 
less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this 
Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as pro-
vided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting 
with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly 
solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person 
to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistaken-
ly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was 
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the lo-
cation where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware 
that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemea-
nor. 
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (l)(b) and (2)(c), a plea of 
guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance under Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has 
been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance agree-
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ment. 
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, notwithstand-
ing a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this chapter. 
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu 
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, 
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a 
bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a 
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con-
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so 
with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his 
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or adminis-
tering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an as-
sistant or orderly under his direction and supervision. 
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a 
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his em-
ployment. 
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as 
defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona 
fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian 
religion as defined in Subsection 58- 37-2(1 )(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in 
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, 
possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in 
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion. 
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative de-
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fense under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than ten days prior 
to trial. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good 
cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to 
the charges. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-2 (2008) 
§ 77-7-2. Arrest by peace officers 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without warrant, 
arrest a person: 
(l)(a) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer; 
and 
(b) as used in this Subsection (1), "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or records the 
observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A misde-
meanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested 
has committed it; 
(3) when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a 
public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person; or 
(4) when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed the 
offense of failure to disclose identity under Section 76-8- 301.5. 
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State of Utah vs. Alex Preston Nimer Preliminarv Hearing 
Alright Ms. Chesnut. 
Your Honor I'm ready on a preliminary hearing. I also have a 
matter to address with Ms. Fritz, but she hasn't been transported so 
we can do the preliminary hearing first. 
Alright. What preliminary hearing? 
Alex Nimer, N-l-M-E-R. 
Aaron Flater for the State. 
Alright. Mr. Nimer's here, the charges are unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, second degree felony; and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. Ms. Chesnut do you 
waive formal reading of the information? 
We do Your Honor. 
And is the State ready to proceed? 
Yes. 
Go ahead and call your first witness. 
Thank you Your Honor. The State calls Officer Thomas. 
And Your Honor I believe that there is only one witness, but if there 
are others, defense would ask the Court to invoke the exclusionary 
rule. 
20 Judge: Alright. Do you have any other witnesses here? 
21 ATP: No, just the one. 
22 Judge: Officer if you'll come up and be sworn? 
23 Clerk: Swearing in of witness. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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16 
17 
18 
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Judge: 
ATD: 
Judge: 
ATD: 
ATP: 
Judge: 
ATD: 
Judge: 
ATP: 
Judge: 
ATP: 
ATD: 
1 WIT: 1 Yes. 
2 Judge: Have a seat. 
3 ATP: Officer will you please state your full name and spell your last 
4 name? 
5 WIT: 1 Joshua Casey Thomas, T-H-O-M-A-S. 
6 ATP: And Officer Thomas how long have you been a police officer? 
7 WIT: 1 Year and a half. 
8 ATP: And has all of that time been with Midvale City? 
9 WIT: 1 Yes. 
10 ATP: Okay. Were you on duty on August 1st, 2008? 
11 WIT: 1 Yes. 
12 ATP: Uh what were you doing on that day? 
13 WIT: 1 Uh regular patrol. 
14 ATP: And uh were you called to...or did you go to a location of 
15 approximately 165 West 7200 South in Salt Lake County? 
16 WIT: 1 Yes. 
17 ATP: And when you arrived at that location uh what did you see? 
18 WIT: 1 Uh I was called for suspicious circumstance. Um the call said a 
19 female was shooting up heroin and Sportsman's Warehouse had 
20 them on camera. 
21 ATP: And did you see uh a female when you got there? Did you see a 
22 female who appeared to be using drugs? 
State of Utah vs. Alex Preston Nimer Preliminary Hearing 
1 WIT: 1 Yes. I got out of my vehicle and uh was hiding behind the vehicle, 
2 and I peeked around the corner and she was shooting up 
3 heroin...or what was later identified as heroin. 
4 ATP: Was she alone? 
5 WIT: 1 At the time yes, and so I approached her and took her into custody. 
6 And then an employee from Sportsman's Warehouse came out and 
7 said that on camera they had that two other males were standing 
8 up...at the front of...outside of the front of the store, uh was with 
9 this female. 
10 ATP: And did you see the two men that were identified as being with this 
11 female? 
12 WIT:1 Yes. 
13 ATP: Did you go approach them? 
14 WIT: 1 Yes. 
15 ATP: Now was uh Alex Nimer... Alex Preston Nimer one of those men? 
16 WIT:1 Yes. 
17 ATP: Uh do you see him here in the courtroom today? 
18 WIT:1 Yes. 
19 ATP: And would you point to him and describe what he's wearing 
20 please? 
21 WIT: 1 He's...white shirt and jacket. 
22 ATP: Where is he seated? 
23 WIT: 1 Right here. 
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1 ATP: Urn Your Honor would the Court note for the record that the officer 
2 has identified the Defendant? 
He's identified the Defendant. 
Thank you. Uh did you...did you speak with Mr. Nimer at that time? 
Yes. We walked over to Mr. Nimer and another defendant and 
asked if they had anything in their pockets we should know about, 
Alex replied to me that he had some needles in his pockets. I then 
asked him if he had any needles that were open, he said yes, and 
so we asked him to take his, you know, take those needles out and 
put 'em on the ground, which he did. At that time we took him into 
custody and search incident to arrest, I found a sock full of...which 
was later positively Id'd as uh heroin and paraphernalia. 
And did you speak with uh Mr. Nimer about what the substance 
14 was? 
15 WIT: 1 Yes. 
16 ATP: And what did...what did he say to you? 
17 WIT: 1 I asked what these...uh what was in the balloons, and he...he 
18 proceeded to tell me that they were heroin. 
19 ATP: And what did you do with the heroin that you uh retrieved from Mr. 
20 Nimer? 
21 WIT: 1 I booked it into our crL.into our evidence room. 
22 ATP: Okay. Your Honor may I approach the witness? 
23 Judge: You may. 
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4 
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Judge: 
ATP: 
WIT: 1 
ATP: 
1 ATP: Officer I've handed you what's been marked as uh State's exhibit 
2 number 1. Uh do you recognize that document as pertaining to this 
3 particular case? 
4 WIT: 1 Yes. 
5 ATP: Uh does it have uh an agency case number listed on the top of that 
6 document? 
7 WIT: 1 Yes. 
8 ATP: And does that match the uh your police agency case number uh 
9 from this incident? 
10 WIT:1 Yes. 
11 ATP: Does it also have the...the name of Mr. Alex Nimer on there as a 
12 suspect? 
13 WIT: 1 Yes. 
14 ATP: If you uh will take a look at page two of that document Officer, 
15 there's uh two different items that are identified. Could...could you 
16 indicate on there which item urn correlates to the uh evidence that 
17 you retrieved from Mr. Nimer? 
18 WIT: 1 The top one. 
19 ATP: Uh so are you indicating item 138519? 
20 WIT: 1 Yes. 
21 ATP: And uh...and that is heroin was identified in the seven balloons? 
22 WIT: 1 Uh-huh. 
State of Utah vs. Alex Preston Nimer Preliminary Hearinn 
1 ATP: And how do you know that those were the...that was the item that 
2 you uh retrieved from Mr. Nimer? 
3 WIT: 1 I checked with our spillman report which I booked into our evidence 
4 room. I verified the number and the amount. 
Your Honor the State moves to introduce uh State's exhibit number 
1 into evidence. Uh criminalistic uh analysis report for the heroin 
that was tested. 
Any objection? 
No objection Your Honor. 
It's received. 
And I may have asked you this already, if I did I apologize. 
Did...was this uh...did this take place in the City Limit...or the 
County Limits of Salt Lake County? 
Yes. 
And the location of the...of the place where you contacted Mr. 
Nimer uh was that in a...uh can you describe where that was uh? 
Is it a parking lot of Sportsman's Warehouse is that what you said? 
Yes it was right next to the entrance doors to...it was on the North 
side of the uh Sportsman's Warehouse, next to the entrance doors 
in the parking lot on the curb. 
Okay. And is that a parking lot that's accessible to the public? 
Yes. 
23 ATP: No further questions at this time Your Honor. 
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6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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13 
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15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
ATP: 
Judge: 
ATD: 
Judge: 
ATP: 
WIT:1 
ATP: 
WIT: 1 
ATP: 
WIT: 1 
Thank you, Ms. Chesnut. 
Officer did the call that you originally received of suspicious activity 
include any information about any males that were with the female? 
No. 
And you said when you first saw her that she was alone? 
Yes. 
What exactly was she doing? 
She was sitting on the curb, she had a rubber band around her 
arm, and she had a needle she was going like this sticken the 
needle inside of her. 
She was actually placing the needle inside her at the time? 
Yes. 
Now was she directly in front of Sportsman's Warehouse or to the 
side, or in back? 
She was on the side, which is the East side, in-between two parked 
cars. 
She was between two parked cars? 
Uh-huh, on the curb. 
Did you ever identify the vehicle that she arrived...where...that she 
20 arrived in? 
21 WIT: 1 No. 
22 ATD: Now you said that a Sportsman's Warehouse employee said that 
23 there had been two males with her? 
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6 
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10 
11 
12 
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Judge: 
ATD: 
WIT: 1 
ATD: 
WIT: 1 
ATD: 
WIT: 1 
ATD: 
WIT: 1 
ATD: 
WIT:1 
ATD: 
WIT:1 
ATD: 
1 WIT: 1 Yes. 
2 ATD: Did you only talk to one employee or more than one? 
3 WIT: 1 Uh I talked to two employees. 
4 ATD: Were they security for Sportsman's or simply employees? 
5 WIT: 1 Uh loss prevention, both of 'em. 
6 ATD: Did you actually see this video? 
7 WIT: 1 I... I saw the full video, but some of their video footage cut out. 
8 ATD: Did you see the video at that time or at a later date? 
9 WIT: 1 Later date... later time, same day. 
10 ATD: When they told you the two males had been with this female did 
11 they tell you when they had been together, and where on the 
12 premises they had been together? 
13 WIT: 1 Urn no, they just said there was... all three of'em... they just said 
14 that two of the males were with the female at one time. 
15 ATD: And they didn't say how long before hand? 
16 WIT: 1 No. I...I didn't even know if they were...the males were still there, I 
17 just...they said...at the time after I put the female in 
18 cusody...custody...they said the two males are at the front of the 
19 building right now, and so... 
20 ATD: The employees told you that? 
21 WIT: 1 yes, two employees did. And so we didn't even know if they 
22 were... if the two males were up there, we just happened to walk up 
23 there. The security followed us and they said that's them. 
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1 ATD: Kay. So the security accompanied you up to the front of the 
2 building and showed you that these were the two males? 
3 WIT: 1 Yes. 
4 ATD: Did you ever take the identification of these males? 
5 WIT: 1 Yes. 
6 ATD: When was that? 
7 WIT: 1 At the time of the arrest. After they were taken into custody. 
8 ATD: Okay. Now when you first approached them you said that you 
9 asked them whether they had any weapons? 
10 WIT: 1 Weapons or anything I should know about, yes. 
11 ATD: Is that the only thing you asked them or did you ask them anything 
12 else? 
13 WIT: 1 Nope, that was it. 
14 ATD: Now there's another officer with you, is that correct? 
15 WIT:1 Yes. 
16 ATD: Did the other officer ask them anything? 
17 WIT: 1 Uh not to my knowledge. 
18 ATD: Now did Mr. Nimer immediately produce the needles? 
19 WIT: 1 Yes. 
20 ATD: Would you describe those please? 
21 WIT: 1 Uh clear tube with a orange cap on the end. 
22 ATD: At that time did he tell you anything about the needles? 
23 WIT: 1 No. 
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1 ATD: How many were there? 
2 WIT: 1 I can't be sure cause of all three, urn there were so many needles I 
3 I'm assuming there was at least five, but I did book them into 
4 evidence if I need to get the numbers of that. 
5 ATD: Did the other male produce any objects? 
6 WIT: 1 I don't recall. 
7 ATD: Okay. So it was immediately after producing these needles that 
8 you took him into...placed him under arrest? 
9 WIT: 1 Yes. 
10 ATD: Now did you discover anything other than the needles prior to 
11 placing him under arrest? Maybe I'm not being clear, so he 
12 produced the needles? 
13 WIT: 1 Yes. 
14 ATD: Did he produce anything else at all before you placed him under 
15 arrest? 
16 WIT: 1 Not that I remember. 
17 ATD: After you placed...did you place both of these males under arrest? 
18 WIT: 1 Yes we did. 
19 ATD: Now I think I may not have heard this...this part of the testimony, 
20 but when you were searching him incident to arrest, what did... Mr. 
21 Nimer I should say, when you were searching Mr. Nimer incident to 
22 arrest, what exactly did you find and where was it? 
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1 WIT: 1 I found a black sock in...I don't remember if it was in his pants or in 
2 his...I don't remember if it was in his pants or in his leg...or in his 
3 pockets or in his leg is where I found it. I don't remember. 
4 ATD: Did you personally find it... 
5 WIT: 1 Yes. 
6 ATD: or did the other officer? 
7 WIT: 1 I did. 
8 ATD: Kay. You said that this bio...black sock contained balloons? 
9 WIT: 1 Yes. There were seven balloons uh I don't remember the drug 
10 paraphernalia, but I know there was. I can't recall what the exact 
11 paraphernalia was at this time. 
12 ATD: Okay. Besides the sock, was there any other...was there anything 
13 else located on Mr. Nimer? 
14 WIT:1 Not that I can recall. 
15 ATD: I have no further questions. 
16 Judge: Re-direct? 
17 ATP: Officer have you been trained in the detection and the identification 
18 of narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia? 
19 WIT:1 No. 
20 ATP: Uh did you receive any...any training in the post uh... 
21 WIT: 1 Yes. 
22 ATP: with regards to drug paraphernalia? And what...can you describe 
23 that training? 
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1 WIT: 1 Urn it was a long time ago, I don't...I...I know there's...know that, 
2 you know, Midvale has trained us somewhat not urn having gone 
3 through like a...through a class or anything. But like anything with 
4 balloons urn any white powdery substance, or green leafy 
5 substance. Urn usually if, you know, if I think it's some sort of drug 
6 I field test it. 
7 ATP: Okay. And then with regards to drug paraphernalia as...your 
8 experience as an officer, how often do you come across uh drugs 
9 and drug paraphernalia? 
10 WIT: 1 Uh probably once a week. 
11 ATP: And you've been an officer for a year and a half? 
12 WIT: 1 Yes. And then uh Salt Lake County Protective Services for a year, 
13 so a total of 2 and a half years. 
14 ATP: Okay. Did you encounter uh drug paraphernalia as well in your 
15 previous experience... 
16 WIT: 1 Yes. 
17 ATP: with probation? Uh so are...you're familiar with uh the use...how 
18 drugs are used and what equipment is to... 
19 WIT: 1 Somewhat. 
20 ATD: to use them? Now you indicated that uh you arrested, or you made 
21 the decision to arrest Mr. Nimer after he pulled some needles out of 
22 his pocket. Can you explain why it is that uh you felt that there was 
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significant that he'd pulled needles out of his pocket, what's...what 
were the needles? What did they appear to be? 
Well because of what I had just found right around the corner, to uh 
loss prevention officer's told me these two were related to him...or 
to her in this matter. Urn and finding paraphernalia and urn seeing 
her shoot up heroin, which she admitted to me that urn I...I 
assumed that these were also related to drugs. 
So you be...you believe then based on what you'd seen, urn the 
woman shooting up drugs, and uh that these...and the knowledge 
that these two men were with her, that these were in fact needles 
that were used for...for drug use.? 
Yes. 
No further questions Your Honor. 
Kay anything further Ms. Chesnut? 
Just briefly Your Honor. 
Go ahead. 
Officer have you ever seen diabetic needles before? 
Yes. 
How did these needles differ in appearance from the diabetic 
needles that you have seen in the past? 
Uh these were just needles by themselves, not without any kit, or 
22 anything like that. A kit for... 
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1 ATD: Do you mean that uh there wasn't insulin pulled out of the pocket 
2 along with the needles? 
3 WIT: 1 Uh insulin or a black kit. 
4 ATD: Kay. I have no further questions Your Honor. 
5 Judge: Okay, thank you. Thank you officer. 
6 WIT:1 Thank you. 
7 Judge: Does the State have any other witnesses? 
8 ATP: No Your Honor the State rests. 
9 Judge: Alright. Ms. Chesnut do you intend to present any evidence or call 
10 any witnesses? 
11 ATD: I don't Your Honor. I've advised Mr. Nimer of his right to testify at 
12 this hearing and advised him not to testify, I believe he'll be taking 
13 that advice. 
Are you gonna take your attorney's advice? 
Yes. 
Alright. Anything further on this then? 
No. 
Okay. I'm uh... 
Your Honor I do have some argument... 
Go ahead, let's hear your argument. 
Your Honor I... I'm going to object to the bindover on the basis of 
second degree felony, ask that it be boundover for a third degree 
felony. As I'm reading through the places that would enhance this 
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to a second degree felony, I don't believe that's been shown here. 
The only one that possibly would apply is subsection 8, that the 
crime occurred in a parking...public parking lot or structure. I think 
that there are a couple of different problems with that. This was a 
private business and not a public parking lot. I think that the statute 
contemplates a public parking lot where it is not owned by a private 
entity, which this clearly was. In fact, I don't think it was even clear 
that they were actually in the parking lot when they were discovered 
in possession of these items. It appears that they were simply at 
the front of the store, and so I would object to it being boundover on 
the...as a second degree felony. Also I'd object to the bindover on 
drug paraphernalia, the only evidence of that were these needles 
and it's basically...there's basically nothing independent of the 
other defendant that was originally arrested, to show that these 
were drug paraphernalia. The officer did testify that he thinks that 
there was some paraphernalia found in the sock, but he can't even 
remember what that was and so that can't be the basis of a 
bindover on the paraphernalia. I think there is clearly enough to 
bindover on possession, but as a third degree felony. I don't think 
there's been enough presented on the paraphernalia or on the 
second degree felony. 
Right, Mr. Flater? 
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Thank you Your Honor. I uh just suggest that uh the evidence 
showed that this was a parking lot that was accessible to the public, 
used for uh public...public use, and that it was open at that time. If 
there is some I... I my recollection of the evidence was that the 
officer testified that this was within a public parking lot. If the 
testimony is not clear on that I...I guess we'd ask for the Court's 
permission to re-open the case to explore exactly... 
Well I guess the question I've got, and I had the same question 
which is, subparagraph seven says in a shopping mall, sports 
facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, play house or parking 
lot, or structure adjacent thereto. So they've talked about 
some...some private facilities that and there park...there 
associated parking lots. In this one it says a public parking lot or 
structure, and it seems to me that given what seven said that the 
arguments strong there that what they meant is a parking lot that's 
open to the public for whatever purpose. She's basically saying 
this was the Sportsman's Warehouse parking lot... 
Uh-huh. 
And uh you know on some level uh I would assume that that isn't 
open for any public purpose, that they...that they have restrictions 
on who parks there... 
Right. 
to people who are using their facilities. 
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1 ATP: I understand that argument and I guess uh I did not bring my code 
2 book with me, I'm...I'm curious uh... 
3 Judge: Let's...let's take a look. Is there a... 
4 ATP: If there's a definition. 
5 Judge: definition? It's uh 58-37-8. You know it...there's not a uh public 
6 parking lot or parking lot definition in the definitions part of chapter 
7 37, and there doesn't appear to be anything further in uh paragraph 
8 8 or section 8 that uh explains it any further. So it sort of stands 
9 there, are you aware of any case law either of you? 
10 ATP: I'm... I'm not. Is there a definition of shopping... shopping mall? 
11 Judge: Let's see. No. 
12 ATP: Okay. 
13 Judge: Doesn't look like anything in there is uh is specifically defined. 
14 ATP: Let me... let me just make a motion then because I... I don't have 
15 any case law, I'm not aware of any case law, but I will... I will make 
16 a motion to uh join your motion to amend it to a third degree felony. 
17 Judge: Okay. Then I'll bind that over as a third degree felony, lam 
18 binding over the class B misdemeanor paraphernalia, given the 
19 proximity of the needles to the heroin on his person, even though 
20 they weren't in the same pocket. And uh the female shooting up in 
21 the parking lot who'd earlier been associated with them, I think 
22 there's sufficient uh...there's a sufficient association with the drugs 
23 uh to conclude for purposes of this preliminary hearing that the 
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needles were paraphernalia. So I'm binding over on that as well. 
Do you want to enter pleas at this point? 
Uh yes Your Honor we'll enter not guilty pleas... 
Alright. 
and we'd waive reading. 
Kay, not guilty pleas are entered and then the bindover is to Judge 
Christiansen. 
October 23 at 8:30? 
Your Honor I'm just curious to know whether a uh... is there any 
report from pretrial services in there as to regards to the 
Defendant's compliance with pretrial? 
No. Let's... let metake a look at the... did she... did Melissa provide 
a pretrial? 
The Defendant tells me he's out on bail and not on pretrial services. 
Is he on bail? 
Oh he's out on bail? 
You're not to pretrial? 
Okay (inaudible) thank you. 
Thanks. 
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